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USSR-CUBA: SENIOR PARTY IDEOLOGIST SUSLOV, A POLITBURO MEMBER, HEADS THE SOVIET DELEGATION THAT IS IN HAVANA FOR THE CUBAN PARTY CONGRESS OPENING TOMORROW. Y

ANGOLA WILL ALMOST CERTAINLY BE HIGH ON THE AGENDA OF DISCUSSION TOPICS. SUSLOV WILL NO DOUBT BE FULL OF PRAISE FOR CUBA'S CONTRIBUTION TO THE "LIBERATION" EFFORT IN AFRICA, BUT HE WILL ALSO WANT TO DISSUADE CASTRO FROM THINKING THAT MOSCOW WILL EXPRESS ITS GRATITUDE WITH SIGNIFICANTLY GREATER ECONOMIC AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE. Y

SUSLOV IS NOT LIKELY TO EMPHASIZE, AS DID BREZHNEV WHEN HE VISITED HAVANA TWO YEARS AGO, THE BENEFITS OF DETENTE AND THE GAINS TO BE DERIVED FROM A THAW IN US-CUBAN RELATIONS. THE SOVIETS HAVE A STRONG INTEREST, NOW MORE THAN EVER, IN RELIEVING THE ECONOMIC BURDEN THEY BEAR BECAUSE OF CUBA'S RELATIVE ISOLATION IN THE HEMISPHERE AND, THEREFORE, IN BETTER HAVANA-WASHINGTON RELATIONS. THEY MUST BE AWARE, HOWEVER, THAT CUBA'S INVOLVEMENT IN ANGOLA, ALONG WITH ITS POSITION ON PUERTO RICAN INDEPENDENCE,

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WOULD ARREST ANY MOVEMENT TOWARD RAPPROCHEMENT WITH THE US. MOSCOW

AND HAVANA PROBABLY MADE THE HARD CHOICE ON THESE ISSUES LAST E

SUMMBER. Y

THE SOVIETS HAVE NEW REASON TO FEEL THAT THEY ARE GETTING
SOME PAYOFF FOR THEIR INVESTMENT IN CUBA. LAST SUMMER. CASTRO
SUCCESSFULLY ORGANIZED A CONFERENCE OF LATIN AMERICAN AND CARIBBEAN
COMMUNIST PARTIES IN HAVANA, WHICH THE SOVIETS HOPE WILL BE A
STEPPINGSTONE TOWARD A WORLD COMMUNIST PARTY CONFERENCE. THE
CONFERENCE ADOPTED THE KREMLIN'S LINE AGAINST SUPPORTING ARMED
REVOLUTION AS THE PREFERRED TACTIC IN LATIN AMERICA, AND THE
CUBANS, FOR THE FIRST TIME, WENT SO FAR AS TO SIGN A JOINT
DOCUMENT CONDEMNING THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS BY NAME. (CONFIDENTIAL)+

2. USSR: PETR MASHEROV, BELORUSSIAN FIRST SECRETARY AND CANDIDATE MEMBER OF THE POLITBURO, HAS RECENTLY DE-LIVERED TWO SOMEWHAT DIFFERENT PRONOUNCEMENTS ON ECONOMIC POLICY IN LIGHT OF THE HARVEST FAILURE AND OTHER PROBLEMS. ON HIS HOME TERRITORY AND BEFORE THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE MET IN MOSCOW, HE ATTACKED AN

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IMPORTANT ELEMENT OF AGRICULTURAL POLICY, STRONGLY
IMPLYING CRITICISM OF THE CENTER AND PERHAPS OF
BREZHNEV. IN A POST-PLENUM ARTICLE IN PRAVDA, HOWEVER, HE LAVISHLY PRAISED THE GENERAL SECRETARY
AND DIRECTED ATTENTION TO REFORM MEASURES IN INDUSTRY, A SUBJECT LESS ASSOCIATED WITH BREZHNEV.Y

CENTRAL COMMITTEE ON NOVEMBER 24. A WEEK BEFORE THE CPSU CENTRAL COMMITTEE AND USSR SUPREME SOVIET DISCUSSED THE ECONOMY AND 1976 PLANS. HE BLUNTLY DECRETED ECONOMIC DIFFICULTIES IN THE REPUBLIC. HE NOTED THAT THE REPUBLIC TARGETS FOR EMBUSTRIAL GROWTH NEXT YEAR ARE SMALLER THAN THIS YEAR AND ANNOUNCED THAT THE BELORUSSIAN CENTRAL COMMITTEE HAD ALREADY DECREED THE PRODUCTION OF ABOVE-PLAN OUT-PUT. HE ALSO NOTED THAT PROCUREMENT PLANS FOR MILK AND MEAT NEXT YEAR WERE NO LARGER THAN THIS YEAR'S AND WARNED OF POSSIBLE CUTS IN THE VOLUME OF MAR-

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KETED BASIC FOODSTUFFS IF PLANS ARE NOT MET. TURNING TO THE FARMS, MASHEROV REVEALED THAT ONLY 71

PERCENT OF SOCIALIZED CATTLE IN THE REPUBLIC HAVE
ENOUGH FODDER TO TIDE THEM OVER THE WINTER AND THAT
MAINTENANCE OF THE CURRENT SIZE OF CATTLE HERDS IS
IN DOUBT.4

MASHEROV DID NOT STRESS THE WEATHER AS THE CAUSE OF AGRICULTURAL SHORTFALLS IN THE PRESENT FIVE YEAR PLAN. INSTEAD, HE POINTED TO INSUFFICIENT USE OF AVAILABLE RESOURCES AND THE POTENTIAL FOR IMPROVING EFFICIENCY, SAYING THAT "THIS, AND ONLY THIS," IS THE MAIN REASON BELORUSSIA DID NOT MEET IMPORTANT AGRICULTURAL TARGETS. Y

THE HEART OF MASHEROV'S CRITICISM OF AGRICULTURAL POLICY CONCERNED THE CONSTRUCTION OF LARGE
LIVESTOCK-RAISING AND DAIRY FARMING COMPLEXES. HE
CHARGED THAT LEADERS AND SPECIALISTS, RUSHING TO
CREATE COMPLEXES AND TO GET INVESTMENT FUNDS FOR

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THIS PURPOSE, HAVE IGNORED THE DEVELOPMENT OF FLED PRODUCTION, LEAVING THE NEW COMPLEXES DRASTICALLY SHORT. SAYING THAT THERE ARE INSUFFICIENT MEANS TO CONSTRUCT COMPLEXES AND TO CREATE A FEED BASE SIMULTANEOUSLY, MASHEROV CALLED FOR A "REVIEW" OF THE AGRICULTURAL CONSTRUCTION PROGRAM IN THE NEXT FIVE YEAR PLAN. IN FACT, HE PROPOSED SCRAPPING THE PROGRAM TO BUILD COMPLEXES AND DIRECTING INVESTMENTS TO FODDER PRODUCTION.Y

ALTHOUGH COUCHED IN TERMS OF THE REPUBLIC.

MASHEROV'S CRITIQUE WAS CERTAINLY AIMED ALSO AT THE

AGRICULTURAL BUREAUCRACY IN MOSCOW. FIRST OF ALL

AGRICULTURAL MINISTER POLYANSKY. AND PERHAPS AGRICULTURAL SECRETARY KULAKOV. GIVEN BREZHNEV'S IMPORTANT ROLE IN AGRICULTURAL POLICY. MASHEROV'S

DISCUSSION WOULD SEEM TO IMPLY CRITICISM OF THE

GENERAL SECRETARY. AN ANTI-BREZHNEV INTENT MAY

ALSO BE SEEM IN THE SCARCITY OF REFERENCES TO THE

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Approved For Release 2001/08/21: CIA-RDP86T00608R000300010095-5 OUTGOING MESSAGE . 3 SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY . 104 PAGE 0 0 CLASSIS CATION SECRET NOFORN NOTACIONI BNIJONAH EDABEEM DATE-TIME GROUP MERSAGE REPERENCE NUMBER DISSEM BY: COMF: INFO: FILE PER GENERAL SECRETARY AND THE REFUSAL TO PLAY UP THE OFFICIAL LINE ON THE EFFECT OF POOR WEATHER. THE YEARS, MASHEROV HAS VACILLATED IN HIS SUPPORT

MASHEROV CHANGED HIS TUNE, HOWEVER, IN AN ARTICLE IN PRAVDA ON DECEMBER 7. SHORTLY AFTER THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE AND SUPREME SOVIET MET IN MOSCOW. HE OFFERED A MORE POSITIVE EVALUATION OF THE ECO-NOMIC SITUATION. AND PUT MORE BLAME ON THE WEATHER FOR HARVEST DIFFICULTIES. HE REPEATEDLY PRAISED BREZHNEV AND ATTRIBUTED BELORUSSIAN SUCCESSES TO EFFECTIVE PARTY AND GOVERNMENT MEASURES TAKEN "AT THE INITIATIVE AND WITH THE DIRECT PERSONAL PARTICI-PATION" OF BREZHNEV. Y

FOR BREZHNEV AND HAS ON OCCASION ATTACKED HIS POLI-

CIES, SUCH AS THE CONSUMER PROGRAM IN 1971.4

REMARKING ON THE ENORMOUS SIZE OF INVESTMENT FUNDS, MASHEROV SAID THE IMPORTANT QUESTION WAS THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THEIR USE, WHICH DEPENDS ON LOCAL

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ORGANS {REPUBLIC, KRAY, AND OBLAST} AND ON UNION
MINISTRIES AND DEPARTMENTS. INSTEAD OF ARGUING FOR
ALTERING INVESTMENT PROGRAMS, MASHEROV USED THE
THEME OF EFFECTIVENESS TO ADVOCATE MANAGEMENT REFORMS. IN GENERAL, HE COMPLAINED ABOUT THE CONTINUED SWAY OF INDICATORS OF VOLUME AND QUANTITY.
IN PARTICULAR, HE COMMENDED A BELORUSSIAN EXPERIMENT IN THE CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY, WHERE HE SAID
"NEW APPROACHES AND RADICAL SOLUTIONS" MUST REPLACE THE "FORCEFUL METHODS" OF THE PAST.Y

THE EXPERIMENT, TO START IN JANUARY, INTRODUCES

NEW PLANNING AND PAYMENT PROCEDURES, EXPANDS THE

USE OF ECONOMIC LEVERS AND THE RIGHTS OF BUILDERS,

AND PUTS THE MINISTRY INVOLVED ON A COST-ACCOUNTING

BASIS. BESIS USING THIS EXAMPLE TO ADVOCATE RE
FORM MEASURES IN GENERAL, MASHEROV MAY ALSO HAVE

BEEN TRYING TO DEMONSTRATE THAT THE REPUBLIC IS

ADDRESSING PROBLEMS IN THE CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY,

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DIFFERENCES IN FORUM AND TIMING MAY ACCOUNT FOR SOME OF THE VARIATIONS IN MASHEROV'S TWO STATE-MENTS. THE VARIATIONS HELP OBSCURE MASHEROV'S PRE-CISE INTENT. THE STATEMENTS, NEVERTHELESS, SHOW THAT ECONOMIC DIFFICULTIES PROVIDE AN OPPORTUNITY BOTH FOR OPENING DEBATE ON INVESTMENT PROGRAMS AND FOR RAISING THE ISSUE OF REFORMS. {CONFIDENTIAL}+

3. YUGOZLAVIA: IN ITS FIRST IMPORTANT PERSONNEL MOVE IN ALMOST THREE YEARS, THE SERB PARTY LEADERSHIP LAST SATURDAY P.TZOG OUT-REMUN ZTI OT YRANOITONOIS GUNONOOS GUNOROUS A GEMAN

THE NEWCOMER, IVAN STAMBOLIC, TAKES OVER ONE OF THE MOST RESPONSIBLE POSTS IN THE SERBIAN PARTY. A SECRETARY OF THE REPUBLIC PARTY, STAMBOLIC WILL BE IN THE DIRECT LINE OF FIRE FOR THE DAY-TO-DAY MANAGE-MENT OF BOTH PARTY AFFAIRS AND IMPORTANT POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS.Y

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STAMBOLIC MAY HAVE SOME HIGH-RANKING PATRON IN HIS CORNER. HIS NAME SUGGESTS A RELATIONSHIP TO PETAR STAMBOLIC, SERBIA'S REPRESENTATIVE ON THE YUGO-SLAV COLLECTIVE STATE PRESIDENCY . 4

STAMBOLIC HAS BEEN A MEMBER OF THE SERB CENTRAL COMMITTEE ONLY SINCE APRIL 1974, AND IT IS UNUSUAL FOR SUCH A JUNIOR OFFICIAL TO ASSUME SUCH RESPONSI-BILITY IN SERBIA. THE MOVE SUGGESTS THAT THE RE-PUBLIC PARTY IS BOWING TO PRESSURE FROM THE FEDERAL PARTY ORGANIZATION TO INJECT NEW BLOOD INTO THE LOCAL LEADERSHIPS.Y

STAMBOLIC'S PREDECESSOR WAS DJORDJE LAZIC, A 58-YEAR-OLD PARTY HACK WHO CAME TO POWER IN JANUARY 1973, WHEN ANOTHER YOUNGER MAN AFTER ONLY FOUR MONTHS ON THE JOB, WAS INGLORIOUSLY SACKED FOR INCOMPETENCE. PRESS COMMENTS SUGGEST THAT LAZIC MIGHT NOW BE THE SCAPEGOAT FOR POOR ECONOMIC RESULTS. {CONFIDENTIAL} E-2 IMPDET.A

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WESTERN HEMISPHERE BRIEF 193-75.V

//BRAZIL: A NUMBER OF SENIOR MILITARY OFFICERS REPORTEDLY ARE
UPSET WITH BRAZIL'S RECENT FOREIGN POLICY DECISIONS TO SUPPORT THE
ANTI-ZIONIST RESOLUTION IN THE UN AND TO RECOGNIZE THE SOVIET-BACKED
POPULAR MOVEMENT AS THE LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT OF ANGOLA.//Y

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THE ARMY GENERAL STAFF HAS REJECTED

EXPLANATIONS BY A SENIOR FOREIGN MINISTRY OFFICIAL. THE GENERALS
APPEAR ESPECIALLY OUTRAGED BY THE DIPLOMATIC ACTION ON ANGOLA. THEY
APPARENTLY WERE NOT GONSULTED AND ARGUE THAT THE SOVIETS WILL PROBABLY
ATTEMPT TO ESTABLISH MILITARY BASES IN ANGOLA AND MAKE THE SOUTH
ATLANTIC A CONTESTED REGION.//Y

//FOREIGN MINISTER SILVEIRA 30 FAR HAS NOT PUBLICLY DEPENDED
THE FOREIGN POLICY ACTIONS. HE WEATHERED SIMILAR ATTACKS LAST YEAR
FOR RECOGNIZING THE PEOPLES REPUBLIC OF CHINA AND FOR TILTING TOWARD
THE ARABS. WE SEE NO SIGN THAT SILVEIRA INTENDS TO ALTER HIS APPROACH
TO FOREIGN POLICY. AND HE APPARENTLY STILL ENJOYS THE CONFIDENCE OF
PRESIDENT GEISEL.//

//SILVEIRA'S HIGHLY NATIONALISTIC POSTURE, WHICH OFTEN SPILLS

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OVER INTO ANTI-US POSITIONS, HAS BON HIM CREDIT WITH THE GENERALS AND ENABLED HIM TO GET AWAY WITH ACTIONS THAT OTHERWISE WOULD RANKLE THEM. SOME OF HIS MOST CONTROVERSIAL POLICIES SEEM TO HAVE BEEN UNDERTAKEN--AT LEAST IN PART--FOR THE PURPOSE OF ASSERTING BRAZIL'S INDEPENDENCE IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS.//V

//THE GEISEL ADMINISTRATION HAS HAD ITS SHARE OF REVERSALS
THIS YEAR. AND IT MOULD SUFFER A FURTHER SETDACK IF A MAJORITY OF THE
HIGH COMMAND LINED UP AGAINST SILVEIRA ON A PARTICULAR POLICY ISSUE.

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MIDDLE EAST AFRICA BRIEF 193-75.4

LEBANON: LEBANESE SECURITY FORCES ON MONDAY REPORTEDLY

TOOK OVER THREE HOTELS IN THE DISPUTED INTERNATIONAL HOTEL DISTRICT.

THEIR ACTION IS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE TERMS OF THE LATEST CEASE-FIRE,

BUT SPORADIC SHOOTING THREATENS THE ARRANGEMENT.

PRIME MINISTER KARAMI AND PALESTINIAN LEADER YASIR ARAFAT

APPARENTLY NEGOTIATED THE NEWEST TRUCE LATE SUNDAY NIGHT; IT DIFFERS

FROM ITS PREDECESSOR IN THAT IT CALLS FOR SECURITY FORCES RATHER

THAN THE ARMY TO TAKE UP POSITIONS IN THE EMBATTLED HOTEL DISTRICT.

THIS IS A CONCESSION TO LEBANESE LEFTISTS, WHO CONTROL MUCH OF THE

AREA AND WHO HAVE REFUSED TO RELINQUISH THEIR VANTAGE POINTS TO THE

ARMY. THE LEFTISTS BELIEVE THE SECURITY FORCES WOULD OFFER NO

RESISTANCE SHOULD THE LEFTISTS LATER DECIDE TO RETAKE THE AREA.Y

SOCIALIST LEADER KAMAL JUMBLATT, WHOSE LEFTIST ALLIES HAVE
PLAYED A MAJOR ROLE IN THE RECENT FIGHTING, MET WITH SYRIAN
PRESIDENT ASAD IN DAMASCUS ON MONDAY. THE SYRIANS HAVE SUMMONED A
NUMBER OF LEBANESE LEADERS TO DAMASCUS OVER THE PAST TEN DAYS TO
LAY THE GROUNDWORK FOR AT LEAST A TEMPORARY HALT TO THE FIGHTING.

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IF THESE CONSULTATIONS ARE SUCCESSFUL, ASAD MAY SEND FOREIGN MINISTER KHADDAM TO BEIRUT FOR BROADER MEDIATION EFFORTS.4

VITAL SERVICES IN THE LEBANESE CAPITAL ARE BEGINNING TO BREAK

DOWN. TELEPHONE AND TELEX LINKS BETWEEN BEIRUT AND EUROPE HAVE BEEN

BROKEN. AND US NEWS SERVICES HAVE BEGUN TRANSMITTING THEIR STORIES

THROUGH THE US EMBASSY. THE CITY APPARENTLY IS EXPERIENCING SHORTAGES

OF FOOD AND OTHER SUPPLIES: THESE SHORTAGES MAY BECOME MORE SERIOUS

UNLESS SEA AND GROUND ACCESS ROUTES ARE REOPENED SOON. ALTHOUGH THE

BEIRUT AIRPORT IS STILL OPEN. MOST INTERNATIONAL AIRLINES HAVE CUT

BACK THEIR SERVICES. {CONFIDENTIAL} E-2 IMPDET.H

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J. THAILAND-CAMBODIA: A SERIES OF SHARP CLASHES LATE LAST
WEEK BETWEEN THAI AND CAMBODIAN FORCES JUST INSIDE THAILAND HAS
AGAIN RAISED TENSION ON THE BORDER. THE THAI HAVE MOVED POLICE
REINFORCEMENTS INTO THE AREA BUT SEEM TO WANT TO SOLVE THE PROBLEM
THROUGH NEGOTIATIONS.Y

PUBLICLY - BANGKOK AND PHNOM PENH ARE PLAYING DOWN THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE INCIDENTS IN ORDER NOT TO DISTURB THEIR NEWLY IMPROVED RELATIONS. NEWSPAPER ACCOUNTS SAY LOCAL OFFICIALS FROM BOTH SIDES ARE HOLDING TALKS IN AN EFFORT TO KEEP THE SITUATION FROM WORSENING.Y

THE INCIDENT IS SYMPTOMATIC OF THE WILD WEST ATMOSPHERE
THAT PERVADES THE BORDER AS THE RESULT OF RAMPANT SMUGGLING
AND YEARS OF OFFICIALLY INSPIRED HOSTILITY BY BOTH SIDES.4

LAST SPRING. THAI TROOPS WERE MOVED INTO THE AREA WHEN

THE CAMBODIANS TRIED TO MOVE BORDER MARKERS. LOCAL ANTAGONISM

WILL CONTINUE TO SMOLDER. CREATING PROBLEMS FOR BOTH GOVERNMENTS

FOR SOME TIME TO COME. {CONFIDENTIAL} E-2 IMPDET.H

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